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the common view that educating the public about nuclear safety and technology will increase public 
trust. Further, we find that HK respondents prefer engaging with local experts than 
international/Guangdong authorities. To build trust in NSEG, HK Government should direct attentions 
towards improving public understanding on the significance and contribution of nuclear power in 
overall electricity generation in HK, reducing public fears of nuclear power technologies, and ensuring 
appropriate level of engagement with HK stakeholders. Our proposed methodology can be 
transferrable to other cross-border contexts. 
Keywords: nuclear power; risk perception; government trustworthiness; nuclear safety governance; 
cross-border nuclear safety, Guangdong China, Cross-border Region 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the occurrence of catastrophic nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima, nuclear power 
continues to be developed in most parts of the world, especially in China, due to the increasing 
demands for energy security and climate change mitigation. Five years after the Fukushima disaster, 
the 2016 statistics show that 450 nuclear power reactors are in operation and 60 reactors are under 
construction around the world (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2016). In China, rapid 
socio-economic development, population growth, energy security, and environmental concerns about 
climate change and air pollution have led to a nuclear expansion over the past two decades, with 36 
nuclear power reactors in operation, 20 reactors under construction, and many more being planned as 
of 2016 (Baruah, 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2016). 
Government trustworthiness in nuclear safety emergency governance (NSEG) is put to the test 
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when the government makes plans on nuclear power. Government trustworthiness provides the needed 
reassurance to the public that the government is acting on behalf of their interests and their well-being. 
In a complex society marked by diverse public opinions, satisfying the needs of every citizen is mission 
impossible. Rather, it is important for the government to become trustworthy as it underpins 
government legitimacy and provides the mandate needed for the government to govern (Levi et al., 
2009). Since using nuclear power is a potentially risky endeavour and may provoke anti-nuclear 
protests, government trustworthiness is often at stake when it fails to convince the public that sufficient 
safety measures have been warranted. Hence, it is essential to assess what affect/predict government 
trustworthiness in NSEG in order that informed decisions on nuclear power can be made by the 
government. 
Government trustworthiness is not an exogenous factor to NSEG. Rather, it is intertwined with 
factors such as public risk perception towards nuclear power and knowledge of nuclear safety measures 
(Flynn et al., 1992b; Katsuya, 2001; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). Other factors that might correlate 
with government trustworthiness include stakeholder engagement and demographics such as income 
level and political affiliation (Mah et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2013; Reiner and Liang, 2011; Wilkes, 
2015). In this study, we attempt to identify the predictors/determinants of government trustworthiness 
in NSEG. 
Our study of government trustworthiness in NSEG focuses on HK. The reasons are as follows. 
First, the risk of nuclear power poses a big concern for local citizens. At the time of the Fukushima 
accident, six operational nuclear reactors in cross-border Guangdong Province were 50 km away from 
the centre of HK; two reactors were also under construction in Tai-shan, Guangdong Province, 130 km 
 4 
away from the HK island. Second, local stakeholders are divided on using nuclear energy across the 
border. A study in 2013 shows that 33% of local citizens support the use of nuclear power, while 35% 
of them express opposing opinions (Mah et al., 2014). Third, decisions of HK Government as to 
whether to continue import nuclear energy from Guangdong Province after the current power purchase 
agreement (PPA) expires in 2034 are pending (Kao, 2016). Such decision-making may largely be 
affected by public perception towards NSEG and public trust in HK Government. Until now, existing 
literature about NSEG in HK has failed to investigate the implication of public perception on 
government trustworthiness. A study to gain insights into the predictors/determinants of government 
trustworthiness in NSEG is therefore timely and significant. 
 This study attempts to systematically and quantitatively investigate the predictors/determinants of 
HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. This is done by delving into five key dimensions: 1) risk 
perception of nuclear power technologies, 2) benefit perception of nuclear energy, 3) knowledge about 
nuclear technology and safety, 4) stakeholder engagement, and 5) demographics. By examining what 
factors can affect/predict government trustworthiness, this paper is structured as follows: Section 1 
presents the introduction; Section 2 details the background and related literature; Section 3 lays out 
the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the results; finally, conclusions and policy implications 
are drawn in Section 5. 
2. Background and Related Literature 
2.1 Nuclear Energy in HK 
HK does not have NNPs in its own territory. At the time of the Fukushima accident, HK was in close 
proximity to six operational nuclear reactors in Guangdong Province. All of the six operational reactors 
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were situated 50 km away from the centre of HK. Two of them were from Daya Bay Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP), which is a joint-venture project located in Shenzhen in Guangdong Province. China Light 
and Power (CLP) Group, a local utility in HK, owns 25% shares of this project. The remaining equity 
is owned by China General Nuclear Power Group. HK has been getting its power from about 70% of 
the electricity output from Daya Bay since 1994. A 2014 PPA was signed to temporally increase it to 
80%, so that nuclear energy would account for about 25% of the total electricity demand in HK by 
about 2020 (HK Environment Bureau, 2015). The remaining four operational reactors were from 
Lingao NPP in Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, which is located one kilometre away from Daya 
Bay NPP. In addition, two nuclear reactors were under construction in Tai-shan in Guangdong Province 
at that time (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2016). The risks of these two nuclear power 
plants in close proximity are considered as small as they are 130 km from HK. 
To manage the potential risk from NPPs in Daya Bay and Lingao, the HK Government has defined 
two emergency planning zones (EPZs) according to the distance from the reactors, namely, EPZ1-
20km and EPZ2-85km, based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards 
(International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2007). The island of Ping Chau is the only region in 
HK that lies within EPZ1 zone (see Figure 1), where strict measures including evacuation, sheltering, 
and the use of thyroid block agent must be implemented in case of a nuclear accident. The rest of HK 
is located within EPZ2, where emergency measures consist of a number of controls for food, water, 
and livestock. 
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Figure 1. Emergency planning zones with Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) as the centric 
 
The HK Government has planned to restrict the import of nuclear power within 25% of the total 
electricity demand by 2020 (HK Environment Bureau, 2015). However, as the PPA will expire in 2034, 
the government is faced with tough decisions on whether to extend the contract or terminate the 
contract and then make up for the total electricity supply in HK with other clean energy sources such 
as renewable energy. If the government decides to restrict the import of electricity generated by nuclear 
power, the two nuclear reactors in Daya Bay would be likely to be decommissioned after 2034. 
Nevertheless, HK would still be under the risks of nuclear power because the designed lifespans of the 
four reactors in Lingao NPP are far beyond this timeline.  
2.2 Trust and Government Trustworthiness 
Location Map of Operational NPPs 
in Guangdong Province     
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Citizen trust in the government is based on the conviction that government will act on behalf of their 
personal/group interests (Bannister and Connolly, 2011). However, it is unlikely that the government 
can satisfy all needs of its citizens, in our modern societies, where expectations of citizens are high 
and individual interests may vary widely. To gain trust from the public, a government can strive to be 
trustworthy by exhibiting characteristics of trustworthiness in its decision-making (Levi, 1998). 
Government trustworthiness can be generally defined as an assured reliance on the character, ability, 
strength, or credibility of the government to protect the interests and well-being of its citizens. In the 
context of NSEG, high government trustworthiness can serve as an assurance that nuclear risks are 
sufficiently managed and contingency plans are effective in coping with the consequence of any 
possible nuclear accidents.   
2.3 The Roles of Risk/Benefit Perception, Knowledge, Stakeholder Engagement and 
Demographics 
2.3.1 Perceived Risk of Nuclear Power Technologies 
The correlation between perceived risk and trust has been documented by many studies in the fields 
of risk analysis and management. Biel and Dahlstrand (1995) find a strong negative relationship 
between risk perception of nuclear waste storage and trust in experts. This strong negative relation is 
also demonstrated by studies like Flynn et al. (1992a) and Siegrist et al. (2000). However, some other 
studies point to a rather weak relationship between trust and risk perception (Sjoberg, 2013; Viklund, 
2003). Further, some studies suggest that the relationship between trust and risk perception varies 
according to countries and technologies (Viklund, 2003). 
Among a variety of well-established models investigating perceived risk, the most well-known 
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one in risk perception field is the psychometric model. This method evaluates several risk 
characteristics represented by a number of factors such as voluntariness, dread, and novelty, of which 
the perceived risk is assumed to be a function of these variables (Fischhoff et al., 1978). The main 
assumption is that the risk is subjectively defined by individuals, who are vulnerable to a wide range 
of psychological, social, and institutional factors (Slovic, 1987). Based on the psychometric model, 
the reasons why different hazards tend to receive different perceived risks can be explained. Further, 
in this psychometric paradigm, risks can be generally categorized into two dimensions, namely, threat 
and uncertainty (Fischhoff et al., 1978). A threat risk often gives rise to instinctive feelings of terror, 
uncontrollability, and catastrophe, while an uncertainty risk is generally new and unknown to the 
public and science community. Even though cross-cultural differences have been observed, the 
psychometric model has been replicated in many studies in a number of countries, such as Norway 
(Teigen et al., 1988), Poland (Goszczynska et al., 1991), Italy (Savadori et al., 1998), France 
(Karpowicz‐Lazreg and Mullet, 1993), and China (Chuk‐ling Lai and Tao, 2003), suggesting that it 
can be also used to assess public perception on nuclear risk in HK. 
Previous studies often focus on how trust can affect perceived risk. In HK, a survey conducted by 
Mah et al. (2014) suggests that trust in government could reduce the perceived risks of nuclear 
technologies. However, no studies have investigate the reverse direction in the HK context. It is thus 
important to understand how risk perception towards nuclear technologies can affect/predict HK 
Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. 
2.3.2 Perceived Benefit of Nuclear Energy 
Similar to risk perception, the correlation between perceived benefit and trust has been investigated as 
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well. Risk perception and benefit perception are often inversely correlated (Alhakami and Slovic, 
1994), and trust can affect both perceived risks and benefits (Siegrist et al., 2000). Public awareness 
of the benefits can directly affect their acceptance of technological risks (Starr, 1969). To improve 
public acceptance of nuclear technology, developing nuclear power has been reframed as a strategy to 
combat climate change and improve energy security (Corner et al., 2011). Before the Fukushima 
nuclear accident, studies showed that perceived benefits for the climate and secure energy supply could 
be important determinants of public acceptance on nuclear power (Visschers et al., 2011). Based on a 
follow-up survey shortly after the accident, the authors argue that trust in government has strong effects 
on benefit perception towards nuclear energy at both times (Visschers and Siegrist, 2013). Until now, 
few studies have looked at the reverse direction, i.e., how benefit perception could affect government 
trustworthiness. 
 After the Fukushima accident, anti-nuclear sentiment has surged significantly in many parts of the 
world (Kim et al., 2013). In HK, there are also debates about whether HK should stop importing 
nuclear energy when the PPA ends in 2034 and the Daya Bay NPP has reached at the end of its service 
life by then. By 2020, about 25% of HK’s energy fuel mix will be nuclear energy (HK Environment 
Bureau, 2015). However, it is still unknown that whether the HK citizens’ perceived benefits of nuclear 
energy in securing electricity supply in HK could affect/predict the HK government’s trustworthiness. 
Therefore, there is a need to determine if the HK citizens’ perceived benefits of nuclear energy is an 
important predictor of government trustworthiness with respect to NSEG. This can help HK 
Government understand how imported nuclear energy is perceived by the public. It will also assist the 
formulation of relevant policies to improve government trustworthiness in NSEG in the future. 
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2.3.3 Knowledge about Nuclear Technology and Safety 
Knowledge could affect one’s perception of government trustworthiness by altering his/her risk 
perception towards nuclear power. Some scholars argue that knowledge and education can be effective 
measures to alter people’s perception or attitudes towards nuclear risks (Nealey et al., 1978; 
Stoutenborough et al., 2013). For instance, some early studies have established a positive statistical 
correlation between people’s levels of knowledge on NPPs and their attitudes toward them. These 
studies find that laymen tend to assess nuclear risks significantly higher than the experts do (Kuklinski 
et al., 1982; Nealey et al., 1978). On the other hand, some studies argue that increasing level of 
knowledge could contribute to uncertainty and indecision. For example, a massive education campaign 
on nuclear energy conducted in Sweden in 1970s has shown that very little improvement of public 
attitudes towards NPPs was achieved (Nelkin, 1974). Additionally, the results of an Oak Ridge study, 
a college survey, and a California resident study all reveal that there is no significant relationship 
between public knowledge on nuclear energy and attitudes towards NPPs (Clelland and Bremseth, 
1977; Hensler and Hensler, 1979; Sundstrom et al., 1977). 
Interestingly, some studies also find that the degree of negative relationship between trust and 
perceived risk is influenced by knowledge. Empirical data has shown that the higher the levels of 
respondent’s knowledge about the risk, the weaker the relationship between trust and risk perception 
(Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Sjoberg, 2002). When it comes to nuclear risks, research has found 
that people without much knowledge of the nuclear technology are more likely to base their risk 
perception on their trust in the government (Huang et al., 2013). Nevertheless, few studies have directly 
examined the role of knowledge, both general knowledge about nuclear power and specific knowledge 
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in the context of nuclear emergency, in predicting government trustworthiness. It is therefore needed 
to directly examine whether knowledge (including general knowledge and specific knowledge) is a 
predictor of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. 
2.3.4 Stakeholder Engagement 
Stakeholder engagement refers to involving the general public as part of the formulation, decision, and 
execution of policy issues (Whitmarsh et al., 2005). This process provides people with ownership and 
sense of belonging. It has been recognized as an important means to improve public trust (Bloomfield 
et al., 2001; Brunk, 2006; Cvetkovich, 2013; Denhardt, 2002; Mah et al., 2014; Petts, 2008; Stebbing, 
2009). Stakeholder engagement programs, such as public consulting in HK, are frequently used to 
integrate different values and knowledge into the government decision-making process. Despite the 
potential feasibility of public engagement, a positive result is not always guaranteed. Many studies 
have noted that some stakeholder engagement programs may fail to engage enough citizens, and 
sometimes they could even create distrust (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; OECD, 2009). This might be due to 
the lack of information disclosure, the lack of well-thought initiatives, and the lack of political, 
industrial and business interactions. Arnstein (1969)’s ladder of participation is a well-established 
framework for evaluating the level of public engagement with good reliability and validity. It can be 
used to quantitively evaluate the citizens’ perceived level of engagement in government decision-
making (Langer et al., 2017; Menzel et al., 2013; Reilly et al., 2016). 
In HK, Mah et al. (2014) find that public engagement is important to reduce risk perception of 
nuclear power, but existing public engagement process is often viewed as ineffective. However, how 
different levels of stakeholder engagement could affect government trustworthiness in NSEG, and how 
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public engagement with different authorities (including local experts, Guangdong authorities, and 
international authorities) could make a difference, have yet to be answered. In order to effectively 
manage stakeholder engagement with NSEG in HK, it is therefore necessary to study how stakeholders 
perceive their levels of public engagement, and how government should engage with stakeholders in 
collaboration with different authorities, in order to maximize government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
2.3.5 Demographics 
Demographic variables are crucial for explaining how people perceive the positive and negative 
attributes of nuclear power. Trust perception tends to vary among the public, and socio-demographic 
characteristics often play an important role (Moon and Balasubramanian, 2004; Peters et al., 1997; 
Williams et al., 1999). Demographics can affect one’s perspective of trust in government (Mah et al., 
2014; Meyer et al., 2013; Reiner and Liang, 2011; Wilkes, 2015). Typical factors being used in 
demographics include age, gender, education, and income. In addition, self-identification as Chinese 
citizen, HK citizen, or both could be used in the HK context (La Grange and Ming, 2001). These 
demographic factors can be included in statistical analysis, in order to determine which ones are 
important in predicting government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Sampling and Survey Methods 
In order to determine what factors can predict HK Government’s trustworthiness in cross-border HK-
Guangdong NSEG, we conducted a survey covering five key dimensions: 1) risk perception of nuclear 
power technologies, 2) benefit perception of nuclear energy, 3) knowledge about nuclear technology 
and safety, 4) stakeholder engagement, and 5) demographics. Random telephone survey was conducted 
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by real interviewers from 27 December 2013 to 14 January 2014. A total of 1,032 respondents were 
selected from HK residents aged 18 or above who speak Cantonese by representative sampling. There 
were six parts in the questionnaire: 
A. Perception of the HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG 
B. Perception of risks of death/harm related to nuclear power technologies 
C. Perception of benefits related to nuclear energy 
D. Levels of stakeholder engagement in the HK Government’s NSEG 
E. Knowledge of nuclear technology and safety 
F. Demographics 
3.1.1 Part A – Stakeholder Perception of the HK Government’s Trustworthiness in NSEG 
In order to understand the level of stakeholder trust towards the HK Government’s trustworthiness in 
NSEG, we developed ten questions in our survey covering seven dimensions of trustworthiness based 
on the HK Government’s past performance in environmental protection and resources policy. The 
seven dimensions were designed in a five-point Likert scale: 1 refers to “strongly disagree”, and 5 
refers to “strongly agree”. The seven dimensions include: 
1. Openness – Does the government provide all relevant unclassified information to the public? 
2. Reliability – Does the government endeavour to keep its promises and commitments? 
3. Integrity – Does the government take actions which are consistent with its words? 
4. Credibility – Has the government distorted facts to make its case? Has the government ignored 
the views of scientists who disagreed with them? 
5. Fairness – Is the government committed to impartial decision-making? Has the government made 
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a good faith effort to treat everyone even-handedly? 
6. Caring – Does the government listen to concerns raised by the public? 
7. Competence – Does the government have the necessary skills and expertise to carry out its duties? 
Is the government staffed by first-class experts? 
3.1.2 Part B – Stakeholder Perception of Risks of Death/Harm Related to Nuclear Power 
Technologies 
To further analyse the underlying factors influencing the respondents’ risk perception of nuclear power 
technologies, eight five-point Likert scale questions were developed based on the psychometric 
paradigm proposed by Fischhoff et al. (1978). These questions consist of two categories with regards 
to risk perception, namely, threat and uncertainty. The threat dimension is associated with five risk 
questions of “chronic – catastrophic”, “immediacy of effect”, “voluntariness”, “control over risk”, and 
“severity of consequences”, reflecting several characteristics of the underlying risk such as 
involuntarily, uncontrollability, and catastrophe. The uncertainty dimension is linked with three risk 
questions, including “newness”, “known – unknown to yourself”, and “known – unknown to scientist”, 
illustrating the new and unknown risk to the public and science community. The eight dimensions 
include: 
1. Voluntariness (Threat) – Do you think citizens get into a nuclear risky situation voluntarily or 
involuntarily? 
2. Immediacy of effects (Threat) – If there’s a nuclear accident, to what extent is the risk of death 
immediate? 
3. Control over risks (Threat) – If you are exposed to a nuclear accident, do you think you can, by 
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personal skill or diligence, avoid death? 
4. Chronic-catastrophic (Threat) – Do you think the influence of a nuclear accident is chronic or acute? 
5. Severity of consequences (Threat) – How likely is it that the consequences of a nuclear accident 
will be fatal? 
6. Known – Unknown to yourself (Uncertainty) – To what extent are the risks of a nuclear accident 
known clearly by the citizens who live within the nuclear radiation area? 
7. Known – Unknown to scientist (Uncertainty) – To what extent are the risks of a nuclear accident 
known to science nowadays? 
8. Newness (Uncertainty) – Is the saying “nuclear accidents would bring risks” familiar to you? 
3.1.3 Part C – Stakeholder Perception of Benefits Related to Nuclear Energy 
To understand how the respondents’ benefit perception of nuclear power technologies could affect their 
trust in NSEG, one question related to energy supply was asked on whether HK needs nuclear power 
as a mix of energy sources to ensure a reliable supply of electricity, with a five-point Likert scale, 
where score 1-5 refer to “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
3.1.4 Part D – Levels of Stakeholder Engagement in the HK Government’s NSEG 
Stakeholder engagement is an important part of NSEG decision-making. It could be conducted through 
different mechanisms and it is considered to provide a basis for increasing stakeholder trust in NSEG 
(Mah et al., 2014). To identify which engagement level could give stakeholders the maximum trust in 
the HK Government’s NSEG, six questions were developed based on the ladder of engagement method 
(Arnstein, 1969), with a five-point Likert scale where score 1-5 refer to “decrease a lot”, “decrease a 
bit”, “no change”, “increase a bit”, and “increase a lot”, respectively. Six levels of stakeholder 
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participation were asked, ranging from the lowest form of engagement level (Level 1, Informing) to 
the highest form of engagement level (Level 6, Citizen Control): 
1. Level 1, Informing – Stakeholders are kept being informed of the Contingency Plan 
2. Level 2, Consultation – Stakeholders’ opinions about the Contingency Plan are collected 
3. Level 3, Concession – Stakeholders can join the conversation on the Contingency Plan 
4. Level 4, Partnership – Stakeholders can take part in decision-making of the Contingency Plan 
5. Level 5, Delegated power – Stakeholders can veto the Contingency Plan 
6. Level 6, Citizen control – Stakeholders can make full decisions for the Contingency Plan 
In addition, we asked our respondents whether the HK public should be involved in developing the 
NSEG with a five-point Likert scale, where score 1-5 refer to “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
We also asked our respondents how stakeholder engagement with different authorities would affect 
their trust on the NSEG with a five-point Likert scale, where score 1-5 refer to “decrease a lot”, 
“decrease a bit”, “no change”, “increase a bit”, and “increase a lot”, respectively. The authorities 
consist of local experts, international authorities, and Guangdong authorities: 
1. If stakeholders were engaged alongside local experts and international authorities 
2. If stakeholders were engaged alongside local experts and Guangdong authorities 
3. If stakeholders were engaged alongside international authorities and Guangdong authorities 
4. If stakeholders were engaged alongside local experts, international authorities and Guangdong 
authorities 
3.1.5 Part E – Knowledge of Nuclear Technology and Safety 
To understand the level of our respondents’ knowledge with regards to nuclear technology and safety, 
 17 
and how this can affect their trust in HK Government’s NSEG, two types of questions were assigned 
to our respondents, including general knowledge of nuclear power and specific knowledge in the 
context of nuclear emergency (Table 1). In particular, seven questions were asked, covering nuclear 
energy, location of Daya Bay NPP, source of natural radiation, food safety, medications, evacuation 
region, and source of nuclear incident information. Question 1 and 3-5 are related to the general 
knowledge about nuclear energy and radiation exposure, while Question 2 and 6-7 aim to test the 
specific knowledge in terms of the important countermeasures for HK residents in a nuclear emergency. 
Table 1. Questions for knowledge of nuclear technology and safety 
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Questions Choices Answer description  
(percentage based on 1032 samples) 
Correct Incorrect Refuse to 
answer 
1. Which material is used as fuel for 
producing electricity in a nuclear power 
station? (Correct answer: A) 
A) Uranium; B) Coal; C) 
Oil; D) Natural gas 
 
73% 19% 8% 
2. How far are the Daya Bay nuclear power 
stations from the city centre of Hong Kong? 
(Correct answer: D) 
A) 10 km; B) 15 km; C) 20 
km; D) 50 km 
 
59% 25% 16% 
3. What is the main source of natural 
radiation in daily life? (Correct answer: A) 
A) Radon gas in air; B) 
Cosmic rays;  
C) Rock and soil; D) Food 
and drinks 
33% 59% 9% 
4. Which of the following foods are most 
susceptible to radioactive fallout? (Correct 
answer: B) 
A) Eggs; B) Leafy 
vegetables; C) Shrimp; D) 
Fish 
59% 36% 6% 
5. For people in close vicinity to a nuclear 
accident site, which of the following 
medications could be taken to alleviate the 
effects of radioactive iodine? (Correct 
answer: A)  
A) Thyroid Blocking Agent; 
B) Antibiotics;  
C) High protein; D) 
Analgesic 
55% 22% 24% 
6. According to the current contingency 
plan, which part of Hong Kong needs to 
evacuate in a nuclear emergency? (Correct 
answer: C)    
A) Lamma Island; B) Lantau 
Island;  
C) Ping Chau; D) The whole 
of Hong Kong 
25% 68% 7% 
7. Which institution is the source of official 
information in case of a nuclear incident? 
(Correct answer: B) 
A) HK Observatory; B) 
Guangdong Government;  
C) World Health 
Organization; D) Center for 
Food Safety 
31% 64% 5% 
3.1.6 Part F – Demographics 
Similar to other related studies, demographics can be important predictors. Five demographics, 
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including age, gender, average monthly income, education, and self-identity are included in our 
proposed trust model to determine if they could also be used to predict HK Government’s 
trustworthiness in NSEG. 
 
3.2 Statistical Models 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is applied to understand what dimensions are affecting the 
perception of stakeholder on government trustworthiness. The analytical approach utilizes a variance 
and covariance matrix of the dimensions to extract latent factors, calculate loadings and construct a 
weight vector to estimate the respondents’ perception on government trustworthiness (Lee and Zhong, 
2015). The procedures to derive the weight of seven trustworthiness dimensions are listed as follows: 
1. Latent factors representing dimensions of government trustworthiness are identified. Each latent 
factor depends on a set of loadings and each loading measures the correlation between the 
individual dimension and the factor. The latent factors that preserve a significant amount of 
cumulative variance of the original data are retained to form an un-rotated factor matrix. 
Eigenvalues are computer-generated indicators signalling the significance of latent factors. The 
greater the eigenvalue, the more the component is considered a significant variable. In this study, 
factors that have eigenvalues larger than one are retained. 
2. The un-rotated factor matrix is transformed into a rotated factor matrix by varimax rotation to 
obtain a simpler structure: 
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Rotated factor matrix = �
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹11 ⋯ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1,n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹m,1 ⋯ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹m,n�        (1) 
where FL is the factor loading, m is the total number of dimensions, and n is the total number of 
factors. 
3. A vector equal to the proportion of the explained variance is extracted from the rotated factor 
matrix: 
Proportion vector = [P1 … Pn]                  (2) Pj = ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹k,j)2mk=1∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹k,l)2mk=1nl=1                              (3) 
where P is the proportion of the explained variance, and j is the column number. 
4. Intermediate weights of seven dimensions are calculated from the rotated factor matrix 
corresponding to the factor loadings. An intermediate weight matrix can be formed: 
Intermediate weight matrix = �
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1,1 ⋯ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1,n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼m,1 ⋯ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼m,n�   (4) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ij = (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹i,j)2∑ (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹k,j)2mk=1                               (5) 
where IW is the intermediate weight, i is the row number, and j is the column number. 
5. By multiplying the proportion vector (2) by the transpose of the intermediate weight matrix (4), a 
weight vector to estimate the HK respondents’ perception on government trustworthiness can be 
constructed: 
Weight vector = [P1 … Pn] � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1,1 ⋯ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1,n⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼m,1 ⋯ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼m,n�
T
= [W1 … Wm] (6) 
where W is the weight of the dimensions. 
In general, the higher the weight Wm, the greater the contribution of dimension m (m ranges from 
1 to 7) to the respondents’ perception on overall government trustworthiness. By identifying the 
 21 
weight of each dimension, one can predict how the same increase in the respondents’ agreement 
on such dimension will affect their perception on overall government trustworthiness. Similarly, 
PCA can also be applied to analyse the eight dimensions of risk perception of nuclear power 
technologies and how these risk dimensions are related to each other. 
3.2.2 Ordinal Logistic Regression 
We use the ordinal logistic regression models to further examine the statistical influence of key 
variables listed in Section 3.1, including 1) risk perception of nuclear power technologies, 2) benefit 
perception of nuclear energy, 3) knowledge (general and specific) of nuclear technology and safety, 4) 
stakeholder engagement, and 5) demographics (see Table 2 for detailed definitions of independent 
variables). 
Table 2. Definition of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variable Definition 
Trustworthiness Respondent’s view on the HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG; 
Independent variable Definition 
Overall risk perception Overall risk perception towards nuclear power technologies 
Risk perception (Threat) Risk perception (Threat) towards nuclear power technologies 
Risk perception (Uncertainty) Risk perception (Uncertainty) towards nuclear power technologies 
Benefit perception (Energy supply) 
Respondent’s view on whether HK needs nuclear power as a mix of energy sources to 
ensure a reliable supply of electricity 
General knowledge Total scores of general knowledge of nuclear technology/safety 
Emergency knowledge Total scores of emergency knowledge of nuclear technology/safety 
Expected engagement in 
contingency planning 
 
Respondent’s expectation on whether the public should be involved in developing the 
nuclear safety contingency plan 
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Minimum engagement for trust 
Minimum level of engagement with increase in HK Government’s trustworthiness equal 
to “increase a bit” or “increase a lot” 
Engagement with HK and INTL 
Change of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG by respondent’s engagement with 
local experts and international authorities 
Engagement with HK and GD 
Change of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG by respondent’s engagement with 
local experts and Guangdong authorities; 
Engagement with INTL and GD 
Change of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG by respondent’s engagement with 
international authorities and Guangdong authorities; 
Engagement with ALL 
Change of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG by respondent’s engagement with 
local experts, Guangdong authorities, and international authorities; 
Gender Gender of the respondent;  
Age Age of the respondent 
Income Average monthly income of the respondent;  
Education Education level of the respondent;  
Self-identity 
Self-identity of the respondent, with four categories of “Hong Kong citizen”,  “Chinese 
Citizen”,  “both”, and “none of the above” 
 
As the dependent variable (government trustworthiness) is categorical and ordered, the ordinal logistic 
regression model is adopted for statistical analysis (Lam et al., 2013). It can be denoted as follows: ln �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� � = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝛽n𝑋𝑋n + 𝜀𝜀        (7) 
where 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑗𝑗), 𝑗𝑗 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2; 
Yk = response by respondent k; Yk = 1 (“high trustworthiness”), or 2 (“undecided trustworthiness”); 
αj is the y-intercept for j = 1 (“high trustworthiness”), or j = 2 (“high trustworthiness” or “undecided 
trustworthiness”); 
βj is the slope of the selected variable Xi (see Table 2); and 
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ε is the random error with zero mean and finite variance. 
P1k is the probability of respondent k vote the HK Government as highly trustworthy in NSEG, and 
P2k is the probability of respondent k vote for the low trustworthiness or fail to decide whether the HK 
Government is trustworthy or not in NSEG. 
Pjk could be further determined as 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = exp�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� /�1 + exp (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗)�        (8) 
where 
𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝛽n𝑋𝑋n + 𝜀𝜀 
Therefore, the probability of respondent k viewing the HK Government as highly trustworthy in NSEG 
can be achieved through 
𝑃𝑃1𝑗𝑗 = exp(𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗) /[1 + exp (𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗)]        (9) 
where 
𝐴𝐴1𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝛽n𝑋𝑋n + 𝜀𝜀 
Since there is a positive correlation between P1k and A1k, in general, the probability of respondent k 
viewing the HK Government as highly trustworthy in NSEG can be interpreted as follows: 
If βi > 0, an increase in variable Xi will decrease the HK Government trustworthiness in NSEG; 
If βi < 0, an increase in variable Xi will increase the HK Government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
We conduct model selection to study the key factors that can affect the HK Government’s 
trustworthiness in NSEG. It is conducted in three stages. First, univariate analysis is undertaken to 
assess the potential strength of each independent variable. Next, we run a multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression model with the selected variables that carry a p-value less than 0.1. Finally, we repeat the 
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analysis by including only the statistically significant variables that carry a p-value less than 0.05. 
4. Results and Discussions 
We conducted PCA with varimax rotation to determine the relative contribution of each dimension in 
predicting the HK Government’s trustworthiness (see Section 4.1) and the risk perception of nuclear 
power technologies (see Section 4.2). We then conducted an ordinal logistic regression analysis to 
study the key factors that can affect and predict government trustworthiness in NSEG in HK based on 
five different sets of factors: 1) risk perception of nuclear power technologies, 2) benefit perception of 
nuclear energy, 3) knowledge of nuclear technology and safety, 4) stakeholder engagement, and 5) 
demographics (see Section 4.3). 
4.1 HK Government’s Trustworthiness in NSEG 
HK respondents have different perspectives on the trustworthiness of the HK Government in NSEG. 
As illustrated in Table 3, the PCA model reveals that one component has an eigenvalue greater than 
one and explains 52.74% of the total variance, verifying a sufficiently large correlation between the 
dimensions. This component is also clustered with all seven dimensions, especially for caring, 
reliability and fairness. By contrast, integrity, openness, competence and credibility are less important 
predictors of HK Government’s trustworthiness. Based on Equation (1) – (6), the PCA model capturing 
the relative weightings of the seven dimensions used to estimate the perception of overall government 
trustworthiness in NSEG for all respondents is: 
Trustworthinessx =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.1670.1660.1110.1600.1140.1560.126⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝑇𝑇
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
IntegrityReliabilityOpennessFairnessCompetenceCredibilityCaring ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
   (10) 
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where 𝑥𝑥 indicates respondent 𝑥𝑥. 
Table 3. Principal component analysis of the seven key dimensions of trustworthiness in NSEG 
Key dimensions Survey questions
1 Mean Component 1 
Integrity 
The government takes actions that are consistent with 
its words. 
2.48 0.786 
Reliability  The government tries hard to keep its promises. 2.81 0.783 
Openness The government tells the whole truth of issues. 2.67 0.642 
Fairness 
The government is committed to impartial process for 
making decisions. 
The government makes a good faith effort to treat 
everyone even-handedly. 
2.66 0.768 
Competence 
The government has the necessary skills and ability to 
carry out its job. 
The government is generally staffed by first-class 
experts. 
2.96 0.648 
Credibility 
* The government ignores the views of scientists who 
disagree with them. 
* The government distorts the facts to make its case. 
2.83 0.758 
Caring 
* The government does not listen to concerns raised by 
people like you. 
2.73 0.682 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalue  
Percentage of variance 
Cumulative percentage 
 
3.69 
52.74% 
52.74% 
1. * indicates that the answers are recoded in reverse order for analysis.  
According to the weight calculated above, integrity (16.7%), reliability (16.6%), fairness (16.0%), and 
credibility (15.6%) are the four most heavily weighted dimensions and account for over 60% among 
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all seven dimensions, followed by caring (12.6%), competence (11.4%), and openness (11.1%). With 
predominant dimensions identified, the HK Government can clarify means to improve its overall 
government trustworthiness in NSEG by drawing more attention on these specific fields, i.e., integrity, 
reliability, fairness, and credibility. Additionally, the HK Government can prioritize relevant strategies 
for improving government trustworthiness in NSEG based on the weightings of each dimension. 
4.2 Risk Perception of Nuclear Power Technologies 
PCA is also applied to assess the eight key risk dimensions of nuclear power technologies (Table 4). 
All three components (Component 1: Uncertainty; Component 2: Threat; Component 3: Threat) have 
eigenvalue greater than one and explain 19.94%, 18.76% and 14.16% of the total variance, respectively. 
Thus, these three components explain around 52.86% of the total variance. More specifically, three 
uncertainty components – “newness”, “known – unknown to yourself”, and “known – unknown to 
scientist” are clustered on the first component reflecting the overall uncertainty, while “chronic – 
catastrophic”, “immediacy of effect”, and “severity of consequences” are clustered on the second 
component (Threat). In addition, one dimension of “voluntariness” is clustered on the third component 
(Threat). The remaining dimension – “control over risk” fails to cluster on any of these three 
components statistically significantly. In detail, to provide a general picture of risk perception, PCA is 
performed and weighted vectors are constructed to estimate the loading of each risk dimension of the 
nuclear power technologies based on the same referencing equations from (1) – (6): 
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Risk perception of nuclear power plantsx =  
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1.0510.4440.9140.4171.0050.7940.8410.035⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝑇𝑇
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⎢
⎡
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⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
(11) 
where 𝑥𝑥 indicated respondent 𝑥𝑥. 
Table 4. Principal component analysis of key dimensions of nuclear radiation risk from nuclear power 
plants 
Key dimensions Survey questions1 
Component 1 
(Uncertainty) 
Component 2 
(Threat) 
Component 3 
(Threat) 
Chronic-catastrophic 
Do you think the influence of a nuclear 
accident is chronic or acute? (1=chronic, 
5=acute) 
-0.176 0.548 0.045 
Immediacy of effect 
* If there’s a nuclear accident, to what extent 
is the risk of death immediate? (1= 
immediate, 5=delayed) 
0.004 0.725 -0.285 
Voluntariness 
Do you think citizens get into a nuclear 
risky situation voluntarily or involuntarily? 
(1=voluntary, 5=involuntary) 
0.178 0.118 0.755 
Control over risk 
* If you are exposed to a nuclear accident, 
do you think you can, by personal skill or 
diligence, avoid death? (1=uncontrollable, 
5=controllable) 
0.112 0.456 0.346 
Severity of 
consequences 
How likely do you think the consequences 
of a nuclear accident are fatal? (1=certain 
not to be fatal, 5=certain to be fatal) 
0.098 0.657 0.250 
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Newness 
* Is the saying “nuclear accidents would 
bring risks” familiar to you? (1=very 
unfamiliar, 5=very familiar) 
0.540 0.074 -0.579 
Known-unknown to 
yourself 
To what extent are the risks of a nuclear 
accident known clearly by the citizens who 
live within the nuclear radiation area? 
(1=very clear, 5=very unclear) 
0.735 -0.127 0.186 
Known-unknown to 
scientist 
To what extent are the risks of a nuclear 
accident known to science nowadays? 
(1=very clear, 5=very unclear) 
0.777 0.058 0.006 
In terms of risk dimensions with regard to nuclear power technologies, HK respondents tend to accord 
top priorities to voluntariness, severity of consequences, and control over risk. 
4.3 Factors Explaining HK Government’s Trustworthiness in NSEG 
The results of our ordinal regression analysis are tabulated in Tables 5 - 7. Overall, our statistical 
analysis shows that risk perception towards nuclear power technologies (including overall risk 
perception, threat dimension, and uncertainty dimension), benefit perception with regard to energy 
supply, expected engagement in contingency planning, and average monthly income are significant 
predictors of HK Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. 
Table 5. Univariate ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the HK Government 
trustworthiness in NSEG1 
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Independent Variables β-value p-value  
Overall risk perception 0.652 0.000*** 
Risk perception (Threat) 0.793 0.000*** 
Risk perception (Uncertainty) 0.296 0.000*** 
Benefit perception (Energy supply) -0.448 0.000*** 
General knowledge 0.458 0.051 
Emergency knowledge -0.057 0.788 
Expected engagement in contingency planning 0.337 0.000*** 
Minimum engagement for the HK government to gain the 
citizens’ trust 
0.001 0.712 
Engagement with HK and INTL 0.058 0.678 
Engagement with HK and GD -0.233 0.121 
Engagement with INTL and GD -0.103 0.365 
Engagement with ALL 0.173 0.268 
Gender [male]2 -0.024 0.838 
Age -0.001 0.347 
Income 0.176 0.002** 
Education [primary or below]3 -0.679 0.000*** 
Education [secondary]3 0.097 0.451 
Self-identity [Hong Kong citizen]4 -0.030 0.955 
Self-identity [Chinese citizen]4 -0.816 0.150 
Self-identity [both]4 -0.636 0.235 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. Reference category for gender: “female” 
3. Reference category for education: “tertiary or above” 
4. Reference category for self-identity: “none of the above” 
5. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 6. Ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the HK Government trustworthiness in 
NSEG4 
Variables (Coefficients)  
Total number of valid opinions 863 
Number of 1 (“high trustworthiness”) opinions 225 
Number of 2 (“undecided trustworthiness”) opinions 200 
Number of 3 (“low trustworthiness”) opinions 438 
McFadden pseudo R2 12.1% 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”): α1 3.790*** 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”) or response = 2 
(“undecided trustworthiness”): α2 
5.040*** 
X1 Overall risk perception: β1 0.463*** 
X2 Risk perception (Threat): β2 0.496*** 
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X3 Risk perception (Uncertainty): β3 0.360*** 
X4 Benefit perception (Energy) β4 -0.285*** 
X5 General knowledge: β5 0.172 
X6 Expected engagement in contingency planning: β6 0.277*** 
X7 Income: β7 0.222** 
X8 = 1 if Education = “primary or below” else 0: β8 -0.243 
X9 = 1 if Education = “secondary” else 0: β9 0.268 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. Reference category for education: “tertiary or above” 
3. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
4. All dependent variables that predict overall government trustworthiness via univariate analysis with p-value < 0.1 
(see Table 5) 
 
Table 7. Ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the HK Government trustworthiness in 
NSEG5 
Variables (Coefficients)  
Total number of valid opinions 863 
Number of 1 (“high trustworthiness”) opinions 225 
Number of 2 (“undecided trustworthiness”) opinions 200 
Number of 3 (“low trustworthiness”) opinions 438 
McFadden pseudo R2 11.7% 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”): α1 3.648*** 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”) or response = 2 
(“undecided trustworthiness”): α2 
4.890*** 
X1 Overall risk perception: β1 0.467*** 
X2 Risk perception (Threat): β2 0.501*** 
X3 Risk perception (Uncertainty): β3 0.354*** 
X4 Benefit perception (Energy supply) β4 -0.284*** 
X5 Expected engagement in contingency planning: β5 0.285*** 
X6 Income: β6 0.221** 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
3. All dependent variables that predict overall government trustworthiness via multivariate analysis with p-value < 
0.05 (see Table 6) 
4.3.1 Risk Perception of Nuclear Power Technologies 
Most respondents hold low or neural perceptions towards nuclear risk in HK. In terms of how the 
respondents would assess the level of nuclear risk in HK, 37.4% perceive a low risk and 22.8% 
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perceive a high risk. Overall risk perception, threat dimension of risk perception, and uncertainty 
dimension of risk perception are significant predictors of overall government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
Based on the direction and magnitude of parameter estimates, increase in risk perception (overall, 
threat, and uncertainty) would decrease overall government trustworthiness in NSEG. The results are 
consistent with previous findings in HK that risk perception is negatively correlated to government 
trustworthiness (Mah et al., 2014). 
4.3.2 Benefit Perception of Nuclear Power Technologies 
HK respondents hold different views in terms of the benefit of nuclear power technologies. In terms 
of how the respondents would consider nuclear power as a mix of energy sources to ensure a reliable 
supply of electricity in HK, 39.7% perceive an agreement, while 50.6% perceive a disagreement. 
Benefit perception of using nuclear energy in energy mix in HK is a significant predictor of overall 
government trustworthiness in NSEG. Based on the direction and magnitude of parameter estimate, 
increase in benefit perception of nuclear energy would increase overall government trustworthiness in 
NSEG. This implies that the HK Government could improve public understanding of the benefits 
related to nuclear power technologies, in order to increase public trust in NSEG in HK. 
4.3.3 Expected engagement in contingency planning 
Most respondents have higher expectations on the stakeholder engagement level in HK. With regard 
to how the respondents would assess whether HK public should be involved in developing the nuclear 
safety contingency plan, 19.4% disagree that HK pubic should be involved, and 74.6% agree. Our 
statistical model also shows that expected engagement in contingency planning is a significant 
predictor of overall trustworthiness. Based on the direction and magnitude of parameter estimate, 
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increase in respondent’s expected engagement in contingency planning would decrease his/her 
perception of government trustworthiness in NSEG. In other words, higher expected engagement in 
contingency planning is associated with lower level of public trust in overall government 
trustworthiness in NSEG, suggesting that reducing the level of engagement with the HK stakeholders 
serve the key to improve government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
4.3.3 Demographics Factor: Income 
Demographics information including gender, age, income, education, and self-identification are 
analysed. Our ordinal regression model shows that among all demographic variables, higher level of 
average monthly income is associated with lower level of the overall government trustworthiness in 
NSEG. 
4.3.3 Variables Not Affecting and Predicting HK Government’s Trustworthiness 
Two types of questions, including general knowledge and specific knowledge (in the context of nuclear 
emergency) have been used to assess the influence of knowledge on the HK Government’s 
trustworthiness in NSEG. Our ordinal regression model shows that both general knowledge and 
specific knowledge are not significant predictors of public trust in NSEG (p-value > 0.05, see Table 
6). This implies that strategies that spoon-feed the public with information would not increase 
government trustworthiness in NSEG in HK. Our ordinal regression model also indicates that 
demographics variables, including age, gender, self-identification (p-value > 0.1, see Table 5), and 
education (p-value > 0.05, see Table 6), are insignificant predictors of HK Government’s 
trustworthiness in NSEG. 
The summary of minimum engagement for the HK government to gain the citizens’ trust (the 
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minimum level of engagement with increase in trust equal to “increase a bit” or “increase a lot”) reveals 
that the majority of HK respondents (91.19%) prefer the stakeholder engagement Level 1 – Informing, 
followed by the Level 2 – Consultation with a percentage of 5.39% (see Table 8). In general, HK 
respondents tend to trust the HK Government in NSEG most at Level 1, suggesting that an increment 
in the level of engagement has insignificant contributions to the improvement of overall government 
trustworthiness. 
Table 8. Summary of the minimum engagement for the HK government to gain the citizens’ trust 
(minimum level of engagement with increase in trust equal to “increase a bit” or “increase a lot”) 
Level Number of respondents (%) 
Level 1 91.19 
Level 2 5.39 
Level 3 1.55 
Level 4 1.55 
Level 5 0.10 
Level 6 0.20 
 
Moreover, we also examine how stakeholder engagement with different authorities (including 
local experts, Guangdong authorities, and international authorities) would affect our respondents’ trust 
in NSEG in HK. In total, 80.5% of respondents show an increase in trust if they were engaged with 
local experts and international authorities, 79.6% of respondents show an increase in trust if they were 
engaged with local experts and Guangdong authorities, and 71.7% of respondents show an increase in 
trust if they were engaged with Guangdong authorities and international authorities. This implies that 
HK respondents prefer engaging with local experts than international/Guangdong authorities. However, 
our statistical analysis shows that stakeholder engagement with different authorities would not 
significantly affect people’s trust on NSEG in HK. This statistical insignificance is most likely due to 
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the significant number of non-replies to this set of questions. . 
4.4 Significant Factors for Predicting HK Government’s Trustworthiness in NSEG 
Based on the selected ordinal logistic regression model with only significant variables (see Table 7), 
the formula for predicting the probability of high government trustworthiness of NSEG in HK is as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑃(High Trustworthiness) = exp(𝐴𝐴) [1 + exp(𝐴𝐴)]⁄    (12) 
where 
𝐴𝐴 = 3.648      − 0.467 ×  Overall risk perception towards nuclear technologies
− 0.501 × Risk perception towards nuclear technologies (Threat)
− 0.354 ×  Risk perception towards nuclear technologies (Uncertainty)+ 0.284 × Benefit perception (Energy supply)
−  0.285 × Expected engagement in contingency planning                                     −0.221 × Income. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study evaluates potential determinants/predictors of the HK Government’s trustworthiness in 
NSEG, including risk perception of nuclear power technologies, benefit perception of nuclear energy, 
knowledge about nuclear technology and safety, stakeholder engagement, and demographics. The 
main findings and policy suggestions are as follows: 
1. PCA model has identified integrity as the most influencing factor in predicting the overall 
government trustworthiness in NSEG in HK, followed by reliability, fairness, and credibility. This 
implies that priorities should be given to these four dimensions to improve the public trust most 
 35 
effectively. 
2. In consistent with the existing literature on risk perception of nuclear power technologies, our results 
show that lower perceived risk towards nuclear power technologies, including overall risk perception, 
threat dimension of risk perception, and uncertainty dimension of risk perception, can improve the HK 
Government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. Therefore, strategies for reducing risk perception, including 
both threat dimension and uncertainty dimension, should be implemented to enhance the overall 
government trustworthiness. 
3. Our statistical analysis shows that the perceived benefits of having nuclear energy in energy mix in 
HK is a statistically significant predictor of overall government trustworthiness. To improve public 
trust towards NSEG in HK, the benefits and contribution of nuclear power in the electricity supply of 
HK can be highlighted and such message should be broadly shared across the general public. 
4. In contrast to the common views that knowledge could improve public trust in NSEG, we find that 
knowledge of nuclear technology and safety is not a significant predictor of government 
trustworthiness. This suggests that providing scientific knowledge alone may not reduce public fears 
and increase public confidence in nuclear power technologies. Alternative innovative approaches to 
engage and educate the public and increase their awareness towards nuclear safety, such as science 
fairs or competitions that cover the relevant areas of science and technology may need to be introduced, 
in order to increase government trustworthiness in the HK context. 
5. In terms of stakeholder engagement, an important insight from our survey is that HK people prefer 
engaging with the local experts than international/Guangdong authorities. This suggests that local 
experts should be substantially involved in public engagement activities when collaborating with other 
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international/Guangdong authorities. Moreover, our results have shown that the expected engagement 
in emergency planning is negatively associated with the overall government trustworthiness. Therefore, 
to improve the level of government trustworthiness, reducing the level of engagement with the HK 
stakeholders may be the key. Specifically, devoting more efforts into stakeholder engagement may not 
have significant impacts on improving the government trustworthiness, as most people are satisfied 
with the lowest level of engagement (Level 1 - Informing), while the minimum engagement for trust 
is statistically insignificant in predicting the HK Government’s trustworthiness. 
6. Among all demographic factors represented by age, gender, education, average monthly income, 
and self-identity, only average monthly income contributes to the overall public trust in NSEG 
statistically significantly. The higher the level of monthly income, the lower the Government’s 
trustworthiness. This implies that HK Government’s trustworthiness can be improved more 
significantly if we target at the higher income groups for nuclear emergency trust-building. 
The lack of trusts among different stakeholders including the Government, professionals in the 
industry, and regulators, has presented a major challenge in the realm of nuclear power, especially 
when it involves cross-border nuclear power decision-making (Siegrist et al., 2000; Siegrist et al., 
2005). The lack of transparency, incomplete information provision, and accidents can exert strong 
effects on the levels of trust of citizens towards the stakeholders (He et al., 2013). The social and civic 
connection between government and trust basically refers to the construction and maintenance of a 
prosperous and civil society. According to a government and its officials, a high likelihood of low 
political legitimacy is observed in a society where people doubt each other and choose not to engage 
(Blind, 2007). The stakeholders in HK have widely adopted the command-and-control mode of 
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governance, and critics on the introduction of voluntary agreements could be related to deficits in trust. 
It is difficult to change the status quo, as many stakeholders presumably do not trust the government 
or the businesses to operate these voluntary agreements effectively (Hills, 2005). To improve the public 
trust in NSEG in HK, the concepts of nuclear regulation and risk management may need to be 
integrated into the policymakers’ agenda. A more risk-coping approach for the industry needs to be 
established, and corporate governance of security performance needs to be refined (World Institute for 
Nuclear Security (WINS), 2014). On a larger scale, local nuclear experts should connect with 
international/Guangdong authorities in a structured and effective manner and share their insights on 
security practices to HK citizens. Nuclear security needs to be improved and the nuclear industry needs 
to be incentivized to encourage best practices and outstanding performances including the capability 
to cope with security threats. The government should be accountable for the management strategies 
and resources in preparation for the potential adverse events. In the long term, reducing public fears 
towards nuclear technologies, ensuring appropriate level of public engagement, and offering suitable 
training/education programmes in nuclear power and energy security would be a sustainable solution. 
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